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   Productivity in Contests: Organizational
Culture and Personality E⁄ects￿




We study the interaction of organizational culture and personal proso-
cial orientation in team work where teams compete against each other.
In a computerized lab experiment with minimal group design, we prime
subjects to two alternative organizational cultures emphasizing either self-
enhancement or self-trancendence. We ￿nd that e⁄ort is highest in self-
trancendent teams and prosocially oriented subjects perform better than
proself-oriented under that culture. In any other value-culture-mechanism
constellation, performance is worse and/or prosocials and proselves do not
di⁄er in provided e⁄ort. These ￿ndings point out the importance of a
￿ triple-￿t￿of preferences, organizational culture and incentive mechanism.
JEL: Tournaments; Organizational Culture; Personal Values; Teams;
Economic Incentives
Keywords: C91, D23, J33, M52
1 Introduction
Team incentives are present in a majority of US ￿rms (Ledford 1995) and the
trend of adopting them amongst large ￿rms is positive (Lazear and Shaw 2007).
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2007).1 Part of the explanation for the extensive use of team incentives may be
the need to compensate the drawbacks of relative performance incentives, im-
plied by best-performer promotion practices, found in nearly all hierarchical or-
ganizations.2 As suggested by ￿eld evidence (Bandiera et al, 2005), relative eval-
uation may render close-knit groups￿performance suboptimal if other-regarding
group members internalize the negative externality of their e⁄ort on others.3
With regards to this ￿nding, notice that under relative performance schemes,
team incentives may be used to provide a countervailing positive externality
on others. Indeed, in a laboratory study, Nalbantian and Schotter (1997) com-
pare a number of incentive structures, among others one where teams compete
against each other in a repeated contest game (competing teams mechanism).4
They conclude that competing teams outperform other forms of incentives both
in yielding a higher average e⁄ort and a lower variance. One shortcoming of
the Nalbantian and Schotter (1997) study is that they do not control for other-
regarding preferences. Bandiera et al. (2005) deem prosocial concern a crucial
factor undermining the e⁄ectiveness of relative individual performance incen-
tives since it motivates holding back e⁄ort in order not to in￿ ict a negative
externality onto others.
By contrast, prosocially-oriented individuals may e⁄ectively thrive under
team tournaments where e⁄ort has a positive externality for fellow team mem-
bers. Indeed, it may have been prosocial individuals in particular who were
providing the extra productivity in Nalbantian and Schotter￿ s (1997) study. In
addition, once a group is created, the way it functions and the values it adopts
gains importance. Organizational culture may thus be central for the perfor-
mance of the incentive scheme.5 Moreover, a long tradition in organizational re-
search supports the notion that individuals whose values align with those of the
organization they work for are more productive, so called person-organization ￿t
theory (e.g., Ho⁄man & Woehr, 2006; Verquer, Beehr & Wagner, 2003; Schnei-
1This may be surprising given the strong associated free-riding incentives (Holmstr￿m,
1982).
2Evidence on the frequent usage of tournaments is provided by Bull et al. (1987), Baker
et al. (1988).
3Bandiera, Barankay and Rasul (2009) conduct a ￿eld experiment to investigate the e⁄ect
of social-ties (each subject must name 5 others they knew before they started working and 5
others who they became friends with) to other workers on productivity under absolute per-
formance measures. They ￿nd that overall there is a positive e⁄ect of social ties on aggregate
productivity.
4In competing teams there is a positive externality on one￿ s team members alongside the
negative externality on the out-group which is the only externality when individuals compete.
The intra-team positive externality may well more than o⁄set the inter-team negative one
given the tendency for parochial altruism, preference for being nice to ingroups and neutral or
even hostile to outgroups (Choi and Bowles, 2007; Billig and Tajfel, 1973; Rand et al. 2009).
5Organizational culture is an idea in the ￿eld of organizational studies and management,
which describes the psychology, attitudes, experiences, beliefs and values (personal and cul-
tural values) of an organization. It has been de￿ned as "the speci￿c collection of values and
norms that are shared by people and groups in an organization and that control the way they
interact with each other and with stakeholders outside the organization" (Hill and Jones,
2001).
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schemes, as well as between incentives schemes and the organizational culture
within which these incentive schemes are applied. If true, then this implies that
managers may be well advised to tailor incentives schemes to individuals or se-
lect individuals based on their compatibility with incentives schemes. Similarly,
organizations may be best advised to adopt incentive schemes compatible with
the organizational context (such as shared organizational values) to motivate
high performance. In a recent paper, Kosfeld and von Siemens (2007) present a
model where individuals, with di⁄erent degrees of prosocialness, self-select into
ex-ante identical ￿rms. The ￿rms compete for labor force by o⁄ering di⁄erent
incentive schemes. They show that there exists a separating equilibrium where
workers self-select into ￿rms whose incentive schemes are aligned with their per-
sonal preferences, hence providing support for the alignment argument above.
Over time, such self-selection processes are likely to lead to the emergence of
di⁄erent corporate cultures.
In this paper, we attempt to identify the e⁄ects of the organizational culture
and other-regarding concerns on performance under competing teams incentives.
As opposed to the close-knit non-anonymous groups of Bandiera et al. (2005)
and the correlational ￿eld evidence in person-organization ￿t research (Ho⁄man
and Woehr, 2006 for a review), we study this issue in a controlled computerized
laboratory experiment with a minimal group design, which will allow us to draw
causal conclusions.6 If any e⁄ect can be identi￿ed under these conditions, then
the e⁄ect should also matter in environments where the group and others are
more vividly and concretely present. The crucial advantage the lab gives us is
maximal control. First, the competing teams design of Orrison et al. (2004)
allows us to control for free-riding incentives. Second, we exogenously and
randomly assign subjects to two alternative organizational culture treatments.
More speci￿cally, to manipulate organizational culture experimentally we prime
organizational values since organizational values are regarded to be the core el-
ement of organizational cultures (e.g. Hofstede, 2001) and value congruence is
the dominant dimension along which organization-person ￿t is determined (e.g.
Ho⁄man and Woehr, 2006). Evidence suggests that organizational values sup-
portive of cooperation may particularly facilitate team e⁄ectiveness (Mathieu,
Maynard, Rapp and Gilson, 2008). Hence, we speci￿cally primed a support-
ive, prosocially-oriented culture by priming self-transcendence values such as
benevolence and universalism (e.g. Schwartz, 1992), which we contrast with a
competitive, self-interest oriented culture by priming self-enhancement values
such as achievement and power. We also introduce a neutral control condi-
tion in which subjects receive no prime.7 Third, prior to priming, we measure
prosocial preferences by asking each subject to divide a sum of money between
6For literature in economics on group membership and minimal groups, see Eckel and
Grossman (2005) Charness, Rigotti and Rustichini (2007), and McLeish and Oxoby (2007).
7See Schwartz (1992) on personal values. We use value-laden word-scrambles as our priming
method. More speci￿cally this is a so-called supraliminal priming technique, in which subjects
are aware of the task itself, but are not aware that the pattern of words primes values. This is
a well-established method used by psychologists (Bargh, 2006; Bargh and Chartrand, 2000).
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subjects giving more than the median amount to the partner will be referred to
as prosocials and the subjects giving less as proselves throughout the paper.
With exogenous control of organizational cultural values and with knowledge
of individual pro-sociality, we can study which match of personal characteristics
and organizational values induces highest e⁄ort in the competing teams mech-
anism. In line with the tenet of person-organization ￿t research, we expect
prosocials to perform well in a prosocial organizational culture, whereas perfor-
mance to be worse with any other preference-organizational value constellation
due to a mismatch between either the incentive mechanism (team tournament)
and preferences (proself) or preferences and the organizational values (compet-
itive, self-interest culture).8
We ￿nd that subjects primed with competitive, self-oriented organizational
values provided signi￿cantly less e⁄ort than subjects primed with either proso-
cial organizational values or not exposed to a prime. Both proselves and proso-
cials provided least e⁄ort when primed with competitive, self-oriented organi-
zational values. However, prosocials reacted to prosocial priming di⁄erently
than proselves: they put in signi￿cantly more e⁄ort when working in a (primed)
organizational culture that matches their preferences. There was no such ef-
fect when there was a mismatch between the organizational culture, individual
preferences, and the way of incentivizing individuals (competing teams).9 In
ancillary analyses we provide further evidence on detrimental productivity ef-
fects of highly competitive incentive mechanisms, as well as further evidence on
the importance of aligning individual preferences (using additional measures of
individual proself values and risk preferences) with both organizational cultural
values and incentive mechanisms.
To our knowledge, there is only one other economic experiment studying the
e⁄ect of prosocial priming on behavior.10 Our study can be seen to complement
this growing literature. Drouvelis, Metcalfe and Powdthavee (2010) ￿nd that,
compared to a neutral prime, prosocial priming increases e⁄ort in a one-shot
public goods game. Though their ￿ndings are supportive of ours, we do not ￿nd
any di⁄erence in average e⁄ort between the no priming and prosocial priming
condition -we only ￿nd one between the self-oriented and the pro-social prime.
However, their study di⁄ers from ours in many aspects: ￿rstly, the public goods
game they consider has a di⁄erent strategic structure from contests and team
contests. In public good games, equilibrium e⁄orts are ine¢ cient whereas in
our case deviating and contributing more than in the equilibrium decreases
e¢ ciency. In public good games increasing e⁄ort from equilibrium increases all
other participants expected payo⁄s, whereas in ours it has a positive e⁄ect on
8The competing teams incentive mechanism does not match with proself personal values.
The competitive, self-interest culture does not match with prosocial personal preferences.
9In a laboratory labor market Cabrales et al (2009) ￿nd that employers and employees
with similar social preferences self-select onto a commonly preferred incentive platform.
10Methodologically, priming is only recently used in a few pioneering economics experiments,
such as Ahmed and Salas (2009) using religious primes and Boschini, Muren and Persson
(2009) using gender primes.
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a one-shot interaction whereas we have a repeated situation which allows us
to analyze possible deterioration of the priming e⁄ect. Previous studies on
public goods games exhibit deteriorating contributions over time (G￿chter and
Fischbacher, 2009), thus validating this concern. Thirdly, they do not control
for individual prosocial preferences, which we show constitutes an important
moderator of the prosocial priming e⁄ect.
Although no one doubts there will be individual variations in the propen-
sity to respond to tournament incentive schemes, most analyses of tournaments
have nonetheless made the (usually) silent assumption that the observed results
re￿ ect general ￿human￿response propensities that everyone is equally likely to
display. This is why experiments are conducted to ￿nd out if ￿people￿react
di⁄erently to tournament incentives ￿and not to ￿nd out who in an obviously
heterogeneous population is particularly responsive to these schemes, and why.
This neglect is now being corrected with many researchers asking the di¢ cult
￿individual di⁄erences￿question.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the competing teams
incentive mechanism and elaborates on several game theoretical predictions.
Section 3 explains the experimental protocol and the design. In Section 4, the
hypotheses are put forward. Section 5 lays out the statistical analysis. Section
6 concludes.
2 The competing teams game
In this section, we describe the competing teams tournament game.11 For ex-
positional purposes we do not present the general model, instead we focus on
the particular game that subjects in the subsequent experiment actually played.
Consider a game with six participants i = 1;2;:::;6. Participants are equally
divided into two teams j = A;B. Without loss of generality we let f1;2;3g 2 A
and f4;5;6g 2 B. The strategy for each player i is to choose a level of e⁄ort
ei 2 [0;100]. Let e 2 [0;100]6 be the corresponding strategy pro￿le. Exerting
e⁄ort is associated with a cost c(ei) = e2
i=(20) Output is measured at the team
level and is given by the sum of team members e⁄ort choice plus a random term,
Xj =
P
i2j ei + "j, where "j is iid and uniformly distributed on the interval
[￿60;60]. The team with the highest output wins 4800 ECU￿ s which is equally
distributed so that every member of the winning team gets 1600 ECU￿ s. Team
members of the loosing team each receive 600 ECU￿ s. The individual pro￿t
function (for a risk-neutral player) is given by:
￿i(e) = PrfXj > X￿j for i 2 j : eg1600+(1￿PrfXj > X￿j for i 2 j : eg)600￿c(ei)
We are now ready to state the following main result (proof in appendix).
11In the appendix, we give a more general treatment of the game. We show that the Nash
equilibrium prediction given here is the same both under competing teams and in competing
individuals schemes. In fact, equilibrium e⁄ort is independent of the number of prizes in
the competition, or whether participants compete in teams. Therefore, in a symmetric Nash
equilibrium, equilibrium e⁄ort is independent of the contest design.
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equilibrium e￿ = (250=3;250=3;:::;250=3). There is a unique symmetric Nash
equilibrium also when all agents are equally inequity averse.
In the appendix we show that if subjects are equally risk averse then the
equilibrium e⁄ort is below the one under risk neutrality. The formal analysis
here focuses on subjects who are risk neutral and opportunistically motivated
and thus are only interested in maximizing their expected monetary returns.
There is abundant evidence that this is not an exhaustive description of moti-
vating factors of humans in small scale social interactions as the present one.
Let us therefore next brie￿ y discuss the predictions when we accommodate some
of the most predominant alternative theories.
There is evidence that equity concerns (Adams 1965) or altruism (Andreoni,
1990) in￿ uence peoples￿choices. It turns out that most important formalizations
of outcome-oriented or expected outcome-oriented other-regarding preferences
also imply a unique Nash equilibrium which is symmetric (Fehr and Schmidt,
1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Bolton et al 2005 - see appendix for a formal
treatment under the ￿rst modelling approach) at least if all agents are identi-
cal. To intuitively understand the result, consider a symmetric equilibrium with
identical players. Clearly expected payo⁄s are equal and each participant has
an equal chance of winning 1600 ECUs. Deviations up (down) from the equilib-
rium e⁄ort would generate advantageous (disadvantageous) expected inequity if
the agent is concerned with the expected prizes whereas these relationships are
reversed if the agent is concerned with the expected net payo⁄s. Purely out-
come oriented inequity averse agent would prefer contributing more than in the
opportunistic equilibrium e⁄ort since this increases the likelihood of ending up
in the domain of advantageous inequity as opposed to disadvantageous inequity
￿inequity aversion is equivalent to an increase in the value di⁄erence between
the large and the small prizes. A subject who is altruistic (Andreoni, 1991)
towards his co-participants would choose a lower e⁄ort in individual contests




The computerized experiment was conducted in the laboratory of the Max
Planck Institute of Economics in Jena, Germany. The 132 participating sub-
jects were recruited using ORSEE software (Greiner, 2004) and the experiment
was programmed and conducted using z-Tree software (Fischbacher, 2007).
At the beginning of each session, subjects were seated at visually isolated
computer terminals where they received a hardcopy of the instructions, written
12Predictions on the behavior of reciprocally motivated agents are more challenging to pin
down. Increasing one￿ s e⁄ort is kind towards team members and unkind towards non-team-
members. There may be multiple equilibria.
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part of each session, each subject made a standard dictator game13 choice on
how to share 1000 experimental currency units between him/herself and a ran-
domly drawn participant. After this initial stage, subjects were again randomly
matched to groups of six to make e⁄ort choices in the contest. The contest was
repeated 10 times, keeping the matching ￿xed (partners matching). After each
round, the subject learned whether he/she had won the prize and he/she was
reminded of his/her e⁄ort in that round. The contest was unchanged through-
out the ￿rst ten rounds. At round 11 a di⁄erent kind of contest was introduced.
Subjects made e⁄ort choices at ten consecutive rounds of this alternative contest
keeping the group matching ￿xed. There were three alternative contest designs:
one where the six participants competed individually for a single prize of 1600
ECUs (IC(1P)), a second where the six participants competed individually for
three prizes of 1600 ECUs (IC(3P)), and ￿nally a third where two teams of
three were competing for a single prize of 4800 ECUs, a share of 1600 for each
member of the winning team (TC).14
In the ￿rst session, subjects ￿rst interacted in a repeated contest game be-
tween individuals with only one winning prize (IC(1P)), and played contests
between teams (TC) thereafter for the remaining ten rounds. The second ses-
sion was identical to the ￿rst apart from the fact that the ￿rst contests between
individuals involved three prizes instead of one. Now, the ￿rst block of ten
rounds in the third session consisted of repeated team contest. The novel fea-
ture here was that each subject was asked to ￿ll out a word scrambling task after
the dictator game choice and before the ￿rst round of the team contest. (This
priming task is explained in detail in the next subsection). The word scramble
was used to prime subjects into a prosocial, or self-transcendent organizational
culture (TC(PP)) where universalism and benevolence values are the main di-
mensions (see description of value theory in Appendix). During rounds 11 to
20, participants interacted in contests between individuals with three prizes. In
the fourth session, the procedures were identical to the third treatment apart
from the fact that the word scramble task primed participants into a compete-
tive self-oriented, or self-enhancement organizational culture (TC(SP)), where
power and achievement values are the central dimensions. The ￿fth session was
identical to the third and fourth, but now subjects did not ￿ll out the word
scrambling task and thus there was no priming (TC(NP)).
13See Camerer and Fehr (2004), for instance.
14The theoretical results of the previous section were derived for this latter contest. The
results for the ￿rst two can be found in the appendix.
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S1 DG ￿ IC1(1P) TC2 RP PV O
S2 DG ￿ IC1(3P) TC2 RP PV O
S3 DG Prosocial TC1 IC2(3P) RP PV O
S4 DG Self-orient. TC1 IC2(3P) RP PV O
S5 DG - TC1 IC2(3P) RP PV O
(1)
After the 20 rounds of interaction in contests, each participant made a choice
regarding risky lotteries using the Holt and Laury (2002) procedure. This gave
us a measure of risk-aversion of each individual participant. Thereafter, each
participant answered a standard personal value elicitation survey (Schwartz et
al., 2001, explained in the Appendix). Finally, each participant answered an
ex post questionnaire where he/she was asked about the particular strategies
used and for general feed-back about the participation experience. This ex post
questionnaire also indirectly inquired whether participants grasped the purpose
of the experiment and the priming task in particular (standard procedure in
priming experiments, Bargh & Chartrand, 2000).
One of the 22 payo⁄-relevant rounds (one round of dictator game, 20 rounds
of contests, one round of Holt-Laury lottery choice) was chosen for actual pay-
ment. The average earnings amounted to 24,82 Euros.
In the remainder of this paper, we narrowly focus on the ￿rst 10 rounds and
consider only the three alternative competing teams contests. The details of all
the contests are explained in the Section 2 on theoretical predictions.
3.2 Priming procedure
The priming procedure requires subjects to construct a meaningful and gram-
matically correct sentence using four of the ￿ve words they are presented with.
We followed the procedures described in Bargh and Chartrand (2000, also Bargh
et al., 2001). Subjects had to solve 30 items, i.e. scrambled sentences, 15 of
which in each condition primed prosocial / self-transcendence or a self-interest /
self-enhancement values, corresponding to a prosocial and self-oriented organi-
zational culture, respectively. The other 15 items in each condition represented
neutral sentences. Examples are ￿ just be ball we can￿(we can be just, prosocial
prime), ￿ determined be ball we can￿(we can be determined, self-oriented prime),
and ￿ cold food the was be￿(the food was cold, neutral item). Prime-words for the
prosocial and self-oriented condition were taken from the Schwartz Value Survey
(Schwartz, 1992), which lists for each value a series of synonymous or specifying
words. For example, the prime words for prosocial / self-transcendence were
reliable, responsible, helpfulness, honest, loyal, forgiving, sincere, tolerant, just,
wisdom, equality, peace, preserving nature, broad-minded, environmentally con-
scious. We took prime words from the German version of the Schwartz Value
Survey to circumvent translation problems.
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and were given an example how to solve this ￿ word-puzzle￿task. Prime-items
and neutral items were alternated, in order to limit the likelihood that subjects
become aware of the prime content. As already mentioned, the ex post ques-
tionnaire asked subjects a series of ￿ funneled￿questions after the experiment
(see e.g., Bargh et al., 2001). More speci￿cally, subjects were asked what they
thought the experiment tried to capture, whether they think their behavior in
one task was in￿ uenced by another experimental task, if so what those in￿ uences
were, whether they noticed something unusual in the word puzzle, whether they
noticed some kind of pattern or common topic in the word puzzle items and if so
what kind of pattern or common topic they noticed. A total of ￿ve respondents
were excluded from the analyses as they recognized a common theme among
the scrambled sentences (e.g. social justice, achievement, success, power).
3.3 The hypotheses
Our four main hypotheses are summarized as follows:
Hypothesis 1: Average e⁄ort in competing teams is higher under the proso-
cial prime, i.e. in a prosocial organizational culture, than under the self-
interest prime, i.e. in a competitive, self-oriented organizational culture.
Hypothesis 2: Prosocials provide signi￿cantly more e⁄ort than the proselves
in competing teams under the prosocial prime, i.e. in a prosocial organi-
zational culture. There is no such di⁄erence in competing teams under the
self-interest prime, i.e. in competitive self-oriented organizational culture.
Hypothesis 3 Average e⁄ort in the non-primed competing teams treatment is
greater than the average e⁄ort under the self-interest prime, i.e. compet-
itive self-oriented organizational culture.
Hypothesis 4 Average e⁄ort in the non-primed competing teams treatment is
smaller than the average e⁄ort under the prosocial prime, i.e. prosocial
organizational culture.
4 Results
We begin with focusing on the team incentives and thus restrict attention to the
￿rst ten rounds of team contests. Let TC(PP), TC(SP) and TC(NP) denote
the prosocial/self-transcendent, the self-oriented/self-enhancement, and the no-
prime team contests, respectively.
As evident from Figure 1 average e⁄ort is higher in TC(PP) than in TC(SP).
Average e⁄ort in TC(NP) is also greater than in TC(SP). We study these ob-
servations in some detail below.
A fairly conservative way to test whether the e⁄ort levels under these two
priming conditions were di⁄erent is to treat every group (a group consists of
two competing teams) as an independent observation and to take the average
9
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Figure 1: Average group e⁄ort by round in competing teams.
e⁄ort over all periods of each group as the test statistic. Even this conservative
approach indicates a signi￿cant statistical di⁄erence (a Mann-Whitney U Test)
between the two priming treatments (p = 0:0433) and between the non-primed
and the self-interest primed (p = 0:0143). Yet, there is no signi￿cant di⁄erence
between the prosocial prime and the non-prime treatment.15
Result 1 (Hypothesis 1) Average e⁄ort in prosocially primed competing teams
is higher than in self-interest primed teams.
Result 2 (Hypothesis 3) Average e⁄ort in non-primed competing teams is higher
than in self-interest primed teams.
Result 3 (Hypothesis 4) Average e⁄ort in non-primed competing teams is not
lower than in prosocially primed teams.
Organizational researchers (Ho⁄man and Woehr, 2006) ￿nd correlational
￿eld evidence suggesting that a match between individuals￿preferences and the
values of the organization they work for promotes employee performance and
engagement. Extrapolating from this, a match between the incentive mechanism
(team tournament), individuals￿prosocial orientation, and the organizational
(primed) values should induce higher e⁄ort than if there is a mismatch between
these three.
We use the dictator game to capture individuals￿pro-sociality, or prosocial
preferences. Subjects giving more than the median amount of this study are
15The ￿rst result is borderline signi￿cant if we add the dropped subjects (p > 0:0864).
Moreover, as can be seen from Figure 1, the average e⁄orts are below the NE prediction
although not signi￿cantly so (using a binomial test on the average group e⁄ort).
10
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proselves. Notice ￿rst that this coarse measure of pro-sociality is taken before
the subjects were primed and thus the measure is una⁄ected by the behavior in
the contest.16 The priming condition constitutes a proxy for the organizational
culture. We primed prosocial or self-transcendent organizational values (PP)
and self-interest or self-enhancement organizational values (SP). Furthermore,
we included a control condition with no prime, denoted (NP). Competing teams
(TC) constitutes the incentive mechanism in all cases. We test the hypothesis
that prosocials put in higher e⁄ort than proselves in a prosocial organizational
culture whereas there is no such di⁄erence in a self-oriented organizational cul-
ture due to the mismatch either between the individual￿ s prosociality and the
self-oriented primed organizational culture or between individual proself pref-
erences and the team incentive mechanism. Average e⁄ort conditional on both
organizational culture and individual prosociality is given in Table 2.
Prosocial Prime Self-oriented Prime No Prime
Prosocials 73:4 50:8 64:9
(12.5) (13.7) (18.0)
Proselves 59:8 50:8 69:0
(19.6) (25.0) (19.0)
(2)
Indeed, using a one-sided Mann-Whitney U-test we ￿nd a signi￿cant dif-
ference in the average individual e⁄ort (p = 0:0424) between pro-socials and
proselves in the prosocially primed condition, whereas no such e⁄ect is found in
the self-interest primed condition (p = 0:40845) nor in the non-primed condition
(p = 0:20875).17
Result 4 (Hypothesis 2) Prosocials put in higher e⁄ort than proselves in a
prosocially primed organizational culture. There is no such di⁄erence in a self-
oriented primed culture nor in the non-primed condition.
We can shed light on this result by comparing the average e⁄ort of prosocials,
on the one hand, and proselves, on the other, across the three di⁄erent priming
conditions. Table 3 captures the p-values of Mann-Whitney U-tests of equality
16Using this measure in explaining di⁄erences in e⁄ort choices across the two priming con-
ditions is not subject to robustness criticism directed to the dictator game experiments (List
2007; Levitt and List, 2007) as long us the underlying pro-sociality is positively correlated
with dictator giving.
17It should be noted that in this test observations are assumed to be independent. This
commonly made assumption can always be debated. We used individual averages over ten
rounds as a unit of observation. At later rounds e⁄ort may be in￿uenced by e⁄ort of other
group members from earlier rounds. Clealy average e⁄orts within a group can be argued to
violate the indepdence assumption. Rember however that direct feed-back about others￿e⁄ort
was not given thus downplaying this concern.
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PP vs SP NP vs SP PP vs NP
Prosocials p = 0:0017￿￿ p = 0:1436 p = 0:1671
Proselves p = 0:2801 p = 0:0508￿ p = 0:1649
(3)
We ￿nd that prosocials exert signi￿cantly higher e⁄ort when prosocially primed
than when self-interest primed (p = 0:0017). There are no signi￿cant di⁄erences
among prosocials in the other priming conditions. Non-primed proselves, for
their part, provide (weakly) signi￿cantly more e⁄ort than self-interest primed
proselves (p = 0:0508) whereas there are no signi￿cant di⁄erences among pro-
selves in the other priming conditions. This further suggests that it is the
prosocials who react positively to prosocial priming whereas avoiding priming
altogether might be most e⁄ective when motivating the proselves to exert e⁄ort
- at least under a team incentive scheme. In other words, the self-oriented prime,
i.e. a competitive self-interest organizational culture, seems to have supressed
e⁄ort provision of both prosocials and proselves.
A simple OLS estimation (see Table 4, robust standard errors and clustering
by individual), allowing us to control for risk-aversion, provides further support
for our ￿ndings. The individual risk-aversion was elicited using the Holt-Laury
(2002) protocol (see Section 3 and the appendix for more details). As for the es-
timates, dictator game giving is signi￿cant only in the prosocial prime condition
thus further supporting person-organization ￿t theory.
Prosocial Values Prime
Coef. Std. Error P-value
DG :0323385 :0154893 0:049
RP ￿1:257681 1:177934 0:298
Constant 64:61355 10:28909 0:000
Self-oriented Values Prime
Coef. Std. Error P-value
DG :001087 0:01909 0:955
RP 1:800464 2:73498 0:601
Constant 37:84172 21:64651 0:092
No Prime
Coef Std. Error P-value
DG .0091121 .0065423 0.222
RP -1.341407 1.028217 0.249
Constant 71.5291 7.950922 0.000
(4)
4.1 Robustness and Extensions
In this subsection, we present further results that build upon and extend the
above results in two ways: 1) results further suggestive of a detrimental ef-
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relevance of the alignment of individual characteristics with organizational con-
ditions (primed organizational values and incentive schemes). For this purpose,
we include data collected under conditions of individual (rather then team)
competition with one and three prizes respectively.18 Recall that the Nash
equilibrium e⁄ort coincides in all three contest designs.
When comparing e⁄ort levels under non-primed competing teams with the
(non-primed) competing individuals conditions, we ￿nd that e⁄ort is signif-
icantly lower when individuals compete for one prize than when individuals
compete for three prizes or compete in teams (p=0.0253 and p=0.0090 respec-
tively, using a Mann-Whitney U-test and treating group averages as individual
observations). E⁄ort levels for the latter two conditions (competing individuals
with three prizes and competing teams) do not signi￿cantly di⁄er (p=0.01011).
See Table 5 (and also Table 8 in the Appendix). We will discuss these results
with respect to di⁄erences in negative externalities that these di⁄erent incentive
schemes might include.
Result 5 E⁄ort is lower when individuals compete for one price than when
individuals compete for three prizes or when teams compete.
TC (No prime) IC (1 prize) IC (3 prizes)
E⁄ort 66.8200 54.2367 76.9944
(5)
In addition to the behavioral dictator game measure of prosocial preferences,
we use an additional survey measure of prosocial orientation popular in psychol-
ogy (Schwartz et al., 2001). This personal value orientation measure (PVO) of
prosocial preferences di⁄erentiates between prosocial or self-transcendence val-
ues and proself or self-enhancement values. As indicated in Table 1, in part 6 of
each experimental session, each subject answered the personal value orientation
questionnaire (see appendix for a description).
In Table 6 below, we report results of linear random e⁄ects regressions where
we use the full range of elicited preference variables as explanatory variables,
including the ex-post elicited personal value orientation. RP and DG capture
the Holt-Laury (2002) risk-aversion measure and the dictator giving prosociality
measure, respectively. History takes two values, 1 if the subject won the contest
in the previous round and 0 if not. Period takes values 1 to 10 and indicates
the running round number of the contest.
Without any organizational culture emphasis, i.e no prime condition (right-
most column of Table 6), neither our behavioral measure of prosocial pref-
erence (DG), nor our survey measure of it (Pros / Self), nor the behavioral
18There were 6 participants in all groups thus either 1/6 or 1/2 won a prize in these contests.
There were in total N=48 subjects in sessions 1 and 2 where competing individuals treatments
were carried out. See experimental procedure above and the appendix.
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interaction e⁄ect of the proself-orientation and a matching organizational cul-
ture both with prosocial values and with proself values. Proselves (PVO survey)
choose higher e⁄ort when under an proself culture (middle column); prosocials
(behavioral DG) choose higher e⁄ort under prosocial culture (leftmost column).
Competing teams
Prosoc. Prime Self-orient. Prime No Prime
Coef. R.P-v. Coef. R.P-v. Coef. R.P-v.
Hist. 12:291 0:003 23:841 0:001 11:618 0:002
Per. ￿:1627 0:733 ￿3:554 0:000 ￿:8001 0:199
DG :02744 0:080 :0115 0:395 ￿:0073 0:652
RP ￿2:033 0:150 :8223 0:707 ￿1:302 0:480
Pros :3041 0:534 :5048 0:507 :2511 0:634
Self ￿:6618 0:249 1:279 0:086 ￿:3541 0:520
Const 67:294 0:005 4:171 0:939 74:247 0:027
(6)
Result 6 Individual preferences interact with primed organizational values such
that prosocial individuals as measured by dictator game provide higher e⁄ort un-
der prosocial organizational values and proself oriented individuals as measured
by value self-reports provide higher e⁄ort under self-oriented organizational val-
ues.
Results regarding the individual competition are more fully reported in the
appendix since they are not the focus of this paper. However, we wish to
highlight one result supplementing the above analysis and results. There is
no conceivable in￿ uence of prosociality (neither measured as DG or value ori-
entation) on e⁄ort in the competing individuals conditions. However, we ￿nd
that risk-preference in￿ uences subjects￿e⁄ort choices in the competing individ-
uals condition with one prize, i.e. IC (1P) see Table 7. This is a ￿nding one
might expect, given that chances of winning a prize were lowest in the IC(1P)
condition.
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IC(1P) IC(3P)
Coe⁄, R. P-v. Coe⁄, R. P-v.
History 29.44846 0.000 11.52816 0.054
Period -3.101451 0.000 .4953601 0.587
DG .0053173 0.814 -.0111428 0.469
RP -4.100682 0.061 .1631726 0.885
Pros -9.194155 0.229 -.4050298 0.925
Self 4.765381 0.335 4.620679 0.392
Constant 121.6642 0.007 54.86868 0.048
Note: History is 1 if subject won big prize in previous period.
R. P-v.: Robust standard errors and cluster over groups.
(7)
Result 7 Individual risk-preferences interact with individual incentives such
that more risk preferring individuals provide higher e⁄ort when there is only
one prize to win.
5 Discussion
In this study we have provided new evidence on the celebrated competing teams
mechanism (Nalbantian and Schotter, 1997). We studied the e⁄ects of organi-
zational and personal values on its e⁄ectiveness. Values, whether organizational
or personal, come in two kinds in our study: either prosocial or competitive
(self-oriented).
It should be clear that both organizational and personal values may be criti-
cal for the success of the competing teams mechanism. Yet, a priori it is not clear
whether competitive or prosocial values promote the e⁄ectiveness of the mech-
anism. First, competitive values could further encourage teams to outperform
each other thus driving up e⁄ort. Alternatively, prosocial values could focus
individuals to promote the best of their teams and work harder for its success.
These value e⁄ects may be at play both at the individual and at the organiza-
tional level. Moreover, as suggested by the organization-person ￿t theory (e.g.,
Ho⁄mann and Woehr, 2006; Schneider, 1987), matching personal and organi-
zational values may boost performance through an interaction e⁄ect - prosocial
personalities may thrive in prosocial organizational cultures and competitive
individuals in competitive cultures. The question then is whether it is better
to have teams of prosocial individuals competing in prosocial organizations or
to have competitive teams competing under a competitive organizational cul-
ture, or perhaps even competitive individuals competing under a competitive
organizational culture.
In line with the organization-person ￿t theory, we ￿nd that individuals with
prosocial preferences thrive in pro-social organizational culture and expend more
e⁄ort than competitive individuals - providing ￿rst experimental support for
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e⁄ectiveness (Mathieu, Maynard et al., 2008).19 Yet, there are no di⁄erences
between these groups either in the neutral condition without any organizational
culture or under the competitive culture. The latter result seems to challenge the
organization-person ￿t theory according to which competitive individuals should
provide more e⁄ort in that condition. We conjecture that this is driven by the
fact that competing teams is incompatible with competitive values and thus
propose and triple-￿t conjecture suggesting that personal and organizational
values must ￿t the incentives used in the organization as well.
Our conjecture is supported by our ￿nding that competitive organizational
culture has detrimental e⁄ects on (both prosocial and self-oriented) individuals￿
willingness to provide e⁄ort when working in competing teams. The average ef-
fort of all individuals is in fact lower under that culture than under the prosocial
or neutral one. In other words, the results indicate that organizations relying
on team work and team incentives need to be careful in vigorously promoting
organizational values of competition and self-interest.
We also compared team and individual incentive contests where either in-
dividuals or teams compete neck-to-neck - with three alternative prize con-
stellations: one prize for a highest output individual, three prizes for highest
outputs, one prize for each individual in the three-member winning team. Al-
though, Nash-equilibrium predictions coincide in all three contests, we ￿nd least
e⁄ort in the individual competition for one prize. One explanation for this re-
sult is the relatively stronger negative externality on one￿ s peers when exerting
e⁄ort in the one prize individual tournament game. Prosocial individuals may
wish to downplay the externality by providing less e⁄ort.20 This suggests a fu-
ture agenda of studying whether individuals with proself personal values thrive
particularly when exposed to strongly competitive incentive mechanisms in com-
petitive, self-oriented organizational cultures, thus establishing the ￿ ip-side of
our main result under the competing teams mechanism.
Beyond the hypothesized ￿ndings, additional analyses on individual proso-
cial and risk preferences preliminarily suggest that the way individual prefer-
ences drive motivation is particularly responsive to intangible workplace charac-
teristics such as organizational culture. Prosocial preferences are responsive to
prosocial organizational values in competitive team work, and risk preferences
responsive to competitiveness of individual contests. Given that both intangible
workplace characteristics and relative incentive schemes play an important role
in today￿ s organizations, we hope our study will stimulate future research and
more e⁄ective organizational design practices.
The paper contributes more generally to organization-person ￿t theory (e.g.,
Ho⁄mann and Woehr, 2006; Schneider, 1987) and management research into
pay for performance (Gerhardt et al., 2009) in pointing to the importance
of a ￿ triple-￿t￿of preferences, organizational culture and incentive mechanism.
Organization-person ￿t theory so far mostly considered the match of people￿ s
19See also Drouvelis et al. (2010).
20See also Bandiera, Barankay and Rasul (2005).
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and management research discuss incentive mechanisms generally without con-
sidering its match with personal preferences or the wider organizational context
such as organizational culture.
Future studies, should use larger samples to increase statistical power that is
needed when testing for interaction e⁄ects (e.g., Brookes et al., 2004). Moreover,
personality variables including the value self-reports should ideally be assessed
independent of and before the experiment. In our study, the contests and the
priming procedure itself may have in￿ uenced responses to the questions elic-
iting personal value orientation and risk preference. Yet, it is important to
note that the dictator-giving measure of prosocial preferences cannot be subject
to this potential endogeneity since dictator-giving is elicited before the play of
the contest game. In addition, future research would bene￿t from using more
￿ne-grained measures of individual prosociality, as well as a more di⁄erenti-
ated prime. For instance, value theory di⁄erentiates benevolence as prosocial
behavior towards the ingroup from universalism as prosocial behavior towards
everybody (Schwartz, 1992). Incentives based on competition may be gener-
ally incompatible with a strong prosocial universalism preference. This is the
negative externality e⁄ect of the Bandiera et al. (2005) conjecture relevant
under relative performance incentives. At the same time, individuals valuing
benevolence might be ideally suited to compete in team tournaments, where
e⁄ort ￿ helps￿the in-group/own team. This suggests interesting, to be further
examined, connections between ingroup-favoritism/parochial altruism, personal
values, and organizational culture.
6 Appendix
6.1 Values orientation questionnaire (How much am I like
this person?)
The personal prosocial and proself value orientations were captured with the
Portrait Values Questionnaire (PVQ, Schwartz, 2003; Schwartz, Lehmann, &
Roccas, 1999; Schwartz, Melech, Lehmann, Burgess, Harris, & Owens, 2001).
The PVQ has been widely used in di⁄erent contexts and shows good psycho-
metric qualities21. Cronbach Alpha reliabilities were .80 for prosocial, self-
transcendence values (consisting of the lower-order universalism and benevo-
lence value scales) and .86 for proself, self-enhancement values (consisting of
the lower-order achievement and power value scales, see Schwartz et al. 2001).
More speci￿cally, the PVQ presents subjects with short portrayals of di⁄erent
people, each describing a person￿ s goals, aspirations, or wishes that point im-
plicitly to the importance of a single value type (Schwartz et al., 2001). For
21Psychometric qualtiy refers to the measurement reliability of a self-report measure in, e.g.
psychological research. It is typically estimated with Cronbach alpha coe¢ cient. Typically test
for psychometric quality include test of dimensionality, or in other words test the clearness with
which the questions that are indicators of underlying constructs map onto the corresponding
constructs in factor analytic or multidimensional scaling techniques (e.g., DeVellis, 1991).
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expensive things.￿ (power) or ￿E thinks it is important that every person in
the world be treated equally. E wants justice for everybody, even for people
E doesn￿ t know.￿ (universalism). Following the protocol of the PVQ, proself
orientation was captured with seven such statements (three capturing power,
four achievement) and prosocial orientation with 10 statements (four for benev-
olence and six for universalism). Statements were presented in random order.
Subject rated the portrayals in response to the question ￿How much like you is
this person?￿on the following scale ￿very much like me￿ , ￿like me￿ , ￿somewhat
like me￿ , ￿a little like me￿ , ￿not like me￿ , and ￿not like me at all￿ . Answers
were coded 6 (very much like me) to 1 (not like me at all) and mean sum scores
for the corresponding items per value calculated.
6.2 Values theory
In this section, we complement the above discussed economists￿approach to
other-regarding concerns with a psychological account on the topic. Values
are desirable, stable, transsituational goals that vary in importance and serve
as guiding principles in people￿ s lives (e.g. Schwartz, 1992). They capture
an essential part of a person￿ s personality relevant to motivation (Roccas et al.,
2002). Values motivate behavior, are decision-making standards as well as guide
attention and the interpretation of situational cues (e.g. De Dreu and Nauta,
2009; Maio et al., 2009; Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz, Sagiv and Boehnke, 2000).
Values di⁄er in their motivational goal, for instance the value of power mo-
tivates behaviours to dominate others, seek recognition, wealth and authority.
Schwartz￿theory of basic human values proposes 10 such value types organized
in two higher-order dimensions. The theory, furthermore, posits that values
show a systematic pattern of con￿ ict and compatibilities. While valuing power
is compatible and indeed associated with valuing achievement (i.e. seeking per-
sonal success through demonstrating competence according to social standards);
power is con￿ icting with universalism (i.e. understanding, appreciation, tol-
erance and protection for the welfare of all people and for nature) and with
benevolence (i.e. caring about the welfare of people to whom one is close). Past
research widely supports the value theory. The structure and proposed pattern
of relations of the 10 value types could be replicated across over 70 cultures
(e.g. Schwartz, 2005). Associations of values with various outcomes including
prosocial behaviours (e.g. Schwartz, 2005, 2009) as well as the stability of values
over time have been demonstrated (Bardi et al., 2009).
Of particular interest for the present research are four values that make up
the higher-order dimension of self-enhancement (including power and achieve-
ment values) vs. self-transcendence value (universalism and benevolence). While
a self-enhancement value orientation re￿ ects a focus on extrinsic motivation
and self-interest, self-transcendence re￿ ects a focus on intrinsic motivation and
prosocial, other-regarding interest (Schwartz, 2009).
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Table 8 reports average e⁄ort choices in our contest games. Average e⁄ort is
higher under the prosocial, self-transcendent prime and under no prime than
under the proself, self-enhancement prime in team tournament contests (TC).
Overall the average e⁄ort levels are often well below the symmetric NE predic-
tion e = 83:333.22 and even more so for the symmetric equilibrium inequity
aversion prediction. See below for a more detailed evaluation of the competing
individuals (IC) condition.
Session Treatment mean sd N min max
1 IC1(3P) 54.2367 38.82687 300 0 100
TC2 57.4233 31.30395 300 0 100
2 IC1(3P) 76.9944 27.14939 180 0 100
TC2 70.0667 34.4219 180 0 100
3 TC1 66.2913 25.89595 230 0 100
IC2(3P) 73.66957 25.87903 220 0 100
4 TC1 50.77308 30.26687 260 0 100
IC2(3P) 71.8407 28.25219 260 0 100
5 TC1 66.82 27.30812 300 0 100
IC2(3P) 77.06667 28.55931 300 0 100
(8)
Table 9 reports how much each subject (between 0 and 1000) o⁄ered to an
anonymous subject.23 As expected, giving does not vary much between sessions.
The average giving is around 30% in all sessions (see Table 9) which is in line
with previous ￿ndings (Camerer and Fehr, 2004). In each session, some subjects
gave nothing and maximal giving was 50% in all but one session.
Session mean sd min max
1 237.1667 178.4303 0 500
2 377.7778 186.4705 0 500
3 326.0435 244.3917 0 1000
4 255.1538 208.6963 0 500
5 320.3333 236.1105 0 1000
(9)
An adjusted Holt-Laury list (Holt and Laury 2002) was conducted in order
to elicit risk-preferences from subjects. Table 10 report the average switch
point of subjects in each session. A higher number of safe choices indicates
more aversion to risk. Four safe choices indicates risk neutrality - the agent
maximizes expected monetary return. On average our subjects display some
risk aversion with the number of safe choices settling at 5.7. This is a bit higher
22Looking at the e⁄orts from the second contests (contest 2) we see that for TC there seems
to be some history dependence since results di⁄er widely between session 1 and 2. In contest
2 there seems to be a weak negative trend in TC treatments but not in the IC(3P) treatments.
23In what follows we denote the Dictator Game o⁄er DG.
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instance, where the average number of safe choices was just above 5.
Session mean sd min max
1 6.652778 1.804114 1 10
2 6.166667 2.437453 1 10
3 6.826087 2.166945 0 10
4 7.096154 1.60012 4 10
5 6.155556 1.797685 0 9
(10)
According to expected utility theory, subjects should switch once and only
once. Unfortunately, this was not the case as can be seen in Table 11 which
reports the average number switches exceeding one. In the analysis section, we
will use the average switch point, denoted (RP), as a measure of risk preferences.
Using the average switch point is common to many experiments using multiple-
price lists (see for example Holt-Laury 2002).
Session mean sd min max
1 .2333333 .8976342 0 4
2 .8888889 1.745208 0 6
3 .3913043 1.87663 0 9
4 .0384615 .1961161 0 1
5 .5333333 1.775957 0 9
(11)
Table 12 reports data from the standardized personal value elicitation ques-
tionnaire pioneered by Schwartz et al. (2001, see above). For each of the two
value orientations (prosocial/self-transcendence value orientation denoted Pros
and proself/self-enhancement value orientation denoted Self) and each individ-
ual, the average of reported scores from the questions related to that category
constitutes a measure of the importance of the value in question for a given
individual. A higher value [between 1 and 6] indicates a stronger personal en-








For completeness, Table 13 reports correlations between the above measures.
We note that there is a negative correlation between prosocial value orientation
and proself value orientation, which is in line with the theoretical predictions
(Schwartz 1992, Schwartz et al. 2001).
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Period
IC(1P) IC(3P)
Average Efforts in IC
Figure 2: Average e⁄ort by round in competing individuals.
DG RP Pros Self
DG 1.0000
RP -0.0220 1.0000
Pros 0.1054 0.0108 1.0000
Self -0.0893 -0.1173 -0.1593* 1.0000
Note: *indicates signi￿cance at 10% level
(13)
6.3.1 Competing individuals (IC)
We brie￿ y present results for the incentive mechanism in which individuals
rather than teams compete. Figure 2 illustrates the evolution of e⁄orts over
time in the competing individuals treatments.24
Figure 2 and Table 8 indicate that individuals competing for three prizes,
IC(3P) put in higher e⁄ort than individuals competing for one prize IC(1P). We
note that this is contrary to the theoretical predictions. While e⁄ort levels are
similar for the ￿rst two periods, e⁄ort under IC (1P) levels o⁄ afterwards. As a
point of departure we ￿rst check if the observed e⁄ort choices are statistically
di⁄erent from the NE prediction e = 83:33. A Wilcoxon matched-pair test
shows that this is case for IC(1P) (p = 0:0431) but not for IC(3P) (p = 0:2850)
25 These results conform with what can be observed in Figure 2. We now
24The corresponding ￿gures for competing teams are given in Figure 1 above.
25A less conservative test is to consider every observation as independent and test for di⁄er-
ences using all observations. We then ￿nd that there is statistical di⁄erence between observed
e⁄ort and equilibrium e⁄ort in all sessions.
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a statistical di⁄erence (p = 0:0253) between the two treatments. Thus we can
safely say that individual contests with three prizes elicit more e⁄ort than similar
contests with only one prize. Notably, this complements the ￿ndings of Orrison
et al. (2004). They report that in six-person competing individuals treatments
there is no signi￿cant di⁄erence in e⁄ort when there are two or three large
prizes but signi￿cantly less e⁄ort when there are four prizes. Together, these
experiments suggest that the relationship between e⁄ort in individual contests
and the number of prizes in non-monotonic, exhibiting an inverse U-shape.
Result 8 Individual competition with three prizes elicits more e⁄ort than indi-
vidual competition with one prize.
Results for the e⁄ects of individual preferences on e⁄ort choices in the com-
peting individuals contests are reported above.
6.4 Theoretical predictions
In this section we present the proof of Proposition 1 but also equilibrium results
concerning individual competition, risk-aversion and equity concerns. For the
interested reader we provide a more general version of the results. Suppose
that there are N players and n > 0 prizes of size M where N > n. If a
player does not win a prize M; she gets the default amount m. Also let "j ￿
U(￿q;q) and iid. Thus when teams compete, team A￿ s output is distributed over
[
P
k2A ek ￿ q;
P
k2A ek + q]. When individuals compete, individual i0s output
is distributed over [ei ￿ q;ei + q]: Moreover the cost function is always de￿ned
as c(ei) = e2
i=(2 ￿ c). A part from this everything is as stated in the theoretial
section.
6.4.1 Risk-neutral symmetric equilibrium, competing teams
Suppose that other teams members as well as members of the other team all
choose b e: Thus the other team has a stochastic output xj distributed uniformly




where X(ei;b e) = [2b e + ei ￿ q; 2b e + ei + q] is the support of i￿ s team output
given e⁄ort, fi(x;ei) is the density of output26 of agent i￿ s team given ei by i
and b e by other two team members and F(x;3b e) is the cumulative distribution
function of the opposing team￿ s output given their aggregate e⁄ort 3b e. If ei > b e,
26fi(x;ei) = 1
2q if x 2 [ei ￿ q;ei + q] and fi(x;ei) = 0 otherwise.
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ei ￿ b e
2q
]]
. If ei < b e, the marginal probability of winning reads
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Thus the unique symmetric equilibrium can be found by setting
e￿ =
c ￿ (M ￿ m)
2q
: (14)















which is positive if at ei the ￿rst derivative is zero.
Assume, to get a contradiction that there exists an asymmtric eqilibrium.
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Implying that ei = et which contradicts our hypothesis.
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We now consider that individuals compete individually and not in teams. Player i￿ s
output is given by ei + "i. In particular, player i wins a prize if her e⁄ort is
amongst the n highest outputs. In our individual competition treatments we
had six participants (N = 6) competing for either one prize (n = 1) or three
prizes (n = 3).
Suppose that others choose b e and they have stochastic outputs xj~U[b e ￿




where X(ei) = [ei ￿ q;ei + q] is the support of i0s output given her e⁄ort,
fi(x;ei) is the density of output27 of agent i given e⁄ort ei, and F(x;ej) is the
cumulative distribution function28 of agent j0s output given e⁄ort ej. If ei > b e,












where fei(x;ei) = 0 since the distribution is uniform. This reduces to [1 ￿
[ei￿b e
2q ]N￿n] 1
2q: If ei < b e, the marginal probability of winning reads
[









. In equilibrium, the marginal probability of winning must equal e=[c ￿ (M ￿ m)]
and thus, independently of the number of prizes, the unique symmetric equilib-
rium satis￿es
e￿ =
c ￿ (M ￿ m)
2q
:
This can be seen for instance by noticing that in the case ei > b e the second
derivative reads
￿(N ￿ n)(







which is negative. In the case ei < b e the second derivative reads









which is positive if at ei the ￿rst derivative is zero.
27fi(x;ei) = 1
2q if x 2 [ei ￿ q;ei + q] and fi(x;ei) = 0 otherwise.
28Fi(x;ei) =
x￿(ei￿q)
2q if x 2 [ei ￿ q;ei + q] and Fi(x;ei) = 0 otherwise.
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and that of the player with the highest e⁄ort reads












The second order condition of the lowest e⁄ort player￿ s maximization problem
is not satis￿ed. Therefore the only equilibrium has symmetric e⁄orts and satisfy
condition (14) above.
6.4.3 Risk-aversion
Generally in contests, the e⁄ect of risk aversion on individual e⁄ort is ambiguous
(see Cornes and Hartley, 2003). In our case, increasing individual risk aversion




(ui(M ￿ c(e￿)) ￿ ui(m ￿ c(e￿)))
Prfn;e￿;e￿igu0
i(M ￿ c(e￿)) + (1 ￿ Prfn;e￿;e￿ig)u0
i(m ￿ c(e￿))
; (15)
where Prfn;e￿;e￿ig denotes the probability of winning one of the n prizes.
Using the fact that f(x) = f(y) +
R x


















and dividing both the numerator and the denominator by u0























For risk averse individuals u00
i <0. There are two negative e⁄ects of increasing





















in the denominator of which the latter is smaller in absolute value and thus
risk-averse individuals provide less e⁄ort.
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The predictions of equity concerns (Adams 1965) will depend on whether agents
are concerned about the equity of actual distribution of prizes and/or payo⁄s
(Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000), the equity of expected
prizes, or the equity of expected net payo⁄s (including e⁄ort) (Bolton et al
2005).
Let us ￿rst consider expected equity. Clearly in a symmetric equilibrium,
expected payo⁄s are equal and each participant has an equal chance of winning
1600 ECUs. Deviations up (down) from the equilibrium e⁄ort would gener-
ate advantageous (inadvantageous) expected inequity if the agent is concerned
by the expected prizes whereas these relationships are reversed if the agent is
concerned by the expected net payo⁄s. Thus, the symmetric equilibrium with
e￿ = 250=3 remains an equilibrium.
More traditional inequity aversion models in economics have modelled an
agent concerned by outcome equity. When three participants receive a prize,
let it be with competing teams or individuals, an inequity averse agent would
prefer contributing more than the equilibrium e⁄ort since this increases the
likelihood of ending up in the domain of advantageous inequity as opposed to
disadvantageous inequity ￿inequity aversion is equivalent to an increase in the
value di⁄erence between the large and the small prizes.29 These results are
spelled out in the following proposition.
The weakness of the theoretical inequity aversion analysis provided here is
that all agents are assumed identical. Experimental evidence, and introspection,
certainly favors a more nuanced view of reality with heterogeneity in (also)
preferences for equity.
Proposition 2 Assuming that all participants are inequity averse with parame-






where n is the number of winning participants in the contest. Thus the equilib-
rium e⁄ort in the contest between individuals with one prize equals










and the equilibrium e⁄ort in the contest between individuals with three prizes
and the contest between teams equals







29When there is only one winning prize, agents highly concerned with advantageous in-
equality would lessen their e⁄ort to avoid ending up being the only winner.
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max
ei
fPrfei;e￿i;ng[1600 ￿ c(ei) + ￿
X
i6=j
(￿i ￿ c(ei) ￿ ￿j ￿ c(ej))]
+(1 ￿ Prfei;e￿i;ng)[600 ￿ c(ei) ￿ ￿
X
i6=j
(￿j ￿ c(ej) ￿ ￿i ￿ c(ei))g;
where ￿i and ￿j are the prizes of player i and j respectively. Consider a symmet-
ric equilibrium with ei = e￿ and the scenario with three participants winning
1600 and three other receiving 600.
fPrfei;e￿ig[1600 ￿ c(e￿) + ￿
X
i6=j
(￿i ￿ c(e￿) ￿ ￿j ￿ c(e￿))]
+(1 ￿ PrfM;ei;e￿ig)[600 ￿ c(e￿) ￿ ￿
X
i6=j
(￿j ￿ c(e￿) ￿ ￿i ￿ c(e￿))g
and the ￿rst order condition equals fFN￿n(E+q) 1
2q ￿FN￿n(E￿q) 1
2qg(1￿￿+
￿)1000 ￿ c0(e￿) = 0 where E is the competor￿ s e⁄ort (be it teams or individu-
als). With our parametrization, we can solve for the symmetric equilibrium e￿
explicitly yielding
e￿ =
c(1 ￿ ￿ + ￿)(M ￿ m)
2q
;
and thus, since ￿ is greater than ￿, inequity aversion drives up equilibrium e⁄ort
to levels above 250
3 . Yet, equilibrium e⁄ort is invariant across teams contests
and individual contest with three prizes.
6.5.1 In-group favoritism
In-group favoritism is a phenomenon evidenced in social psychogy research. In
group favoritism asserts that people put a higher weight on the well-being of
in-groups as opposed to out-groups (Yamagishi et al 1999) and, in the case of
parochial altruism, even a negative weight on the well-being of out-groups (Choi
and Bowles, 2007). In-group favoritism and parochial altruism are thus close
relatives of reciprocity. Yet, whom you are kind to is typically exogenously set
by group membership rather than endogenously arising in equilibrium.
In-group favoritism predicts that e⁄ort in the competing teams treatment is
substantially higher than in other incentive schemes because by increasing e⁄ort
one can be kind to in-groups and hostile to out-groups whereas without teams
there are no well-speci￿ed in- and out-groups.
Notice that in Schwartz￿ s personal value classi￿cation (see Section Values
theory below), benevolence is de￿ned as in-group pro-sociality whereas univer-
salism is pro-sociality towards generalized others including out-groups. Thus,
high scores on benevolence and low scores on universalism seem indicative of
parochial altruism tendencies.
27
Jena Economic Research Papers 2010 - 046References
[1] Adams, J.S. (1965), ￿Inequality in Social Exchange￿In L. Berkowitz (ed.):
Advances in Experimental Psychology, pp. 267-299. Academic Press, New
York, NY.
[2] Andreoni, J. (1990), "Impure Altruism & Donations to Public Goods - A
Theory Of Warm Glow Giving." Economic Journal 100, 464-477.
[3] Ahmed, A. M, and O. Salas (2008), "In the back of your mind: Subliminal
in￿ uences of religious concepts on prosocial behavior", No 331, Working
Papers in Economics, Department of Economics, University of Gothenburg.
[4] Bandiera, O., I. Barankay and I. Rasul (2005), ￿Social Preferences and
the Response to Incentives: Evidence From Personnel Data￿ , Quarterly
Journal of Economics 120: 917-62.
[5] Bandiera, O., I. Barankay and I. Rasul (2009), "Social Incentives in the
Workplace", forthcoming in the Review of Economic Studies.
[6] Bardi, Anat., Lee, J.A., N. Hofmann-Tow￿gh, G. Soutar(2009), "The
Structure of Intra-Individual Value Change", Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 97, 5, 913-929.
[7] Bargh, J. A. (2006),"What have we been priming all these years? On the
development, mechanisms, and ecology of nonconscious social behavior",
European Journal of Social Psychology, 36, 147￿ 168.
[8] Bargh, J. A., and T. L. Chartrand (2000), "The mind in the middle: A
practical guide to priming and automaticity research", In H. T. Reis &
C. M. Judd (Eds.), Handbook of research methods in social and personal-
ity psychology (pp. 253￿ 285). Cambridge, England: Cambridge University
Press.
[9] Bargh, J.A., P.M. Gollwitzer, A. Lee-Chai, K. Barndollar, and R.
Troetschel (2001), "The automated will: Nonconscious priming of acti-
vation and pursuit of behavioral goals", Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 81, 1014-1027.
[10] Baker, G.P., M.C. Jensen and K.J., Murphy (1988), "Compensation and
Incentives: Practice and Theory", Journal of Finance, 43: 593-616.
[11] Bolton, G.E. and A. Ockenfels (2000), "ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reci-
procity, and Competition," American Economic Review, 90, 166-193.
[12] Bolton, G.E., J. Brandts, and A. Ockenfels (2005), "Fair Procedures: Evi-
dence from Games Involving Lotteries", Economic Journal, 115, 1054-1076.
[13] Boschini, A., A. Muren, and M. Persson (2009), "Constructing Gender
in the Economics Lab", Research Papers in Economics, Department of
Economics, Stockholm University No. 2009:15.
28
Jena Economic Research Papers 2010 - 046[14] Bull, B. A. Schotter and K. Weigelt (1987), " Tournaments and Piece Rates:
An Experimental Study", Journal of Political Economy, 95: 1-33.
[15] Cabrales, A., R. Miniaci, M. Piovesan, and G. Ponti (2010), "Social Pref-
erences and Strategic Uncertainty: an Experiment on Markets and Con-
tracts", forthcoming in the American Economic Review.
[16] Camerer, C., and E. Fehr (2004), "Measuring Social Norms and Prefer-
ences", In Heinrich, Boyd, Bowles, Camerer, Fehr, Gintis (eds.) Founda-
tions of Human Sociality, pp. 63-95:Oxford University Press.
[17] Charness, G., L. Rigotti, and A. Rustichini (2007), ￿Individual behavior
and group Membership￿ , American Economic Review, 97: 1340-1352.
[18] Choi J.-K. and S. Bowles (2007), "The Coevolution of Parochial Altruism
and War", Science 318, 636 - 640.
[19] Cornes, R. and R. Hartley (2003), "Risk Aversion, Heterogeneity, and Con-
tests", Public Choice, 117, 1-25.
[20] De Dreu C.K.W., and A. Nauta (2009), "Self-Interest and Other-
Orientation in Organizational Behavior: Implications for Job Perfor-
mance", Prosocial Behavior, and Personal Initiative. Journal of Applied
Psychology, 94, 913￿ 926.
[21] De Vellis, R. F. 1991. Scale Development. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
[22] Drouvelis M., R. Metcalfe, and N. Powdthavee (2010), "Priming cooper-
ation in social dilemma games", Department of Economics and Related
Studies, Discussion Papers in Economics No. 10/07.
[23] Eckel, C. C., and P. J. Grossman (2005), ￿Managing Diversity by Creating
Team Identity￿ , Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 58(3):
371￿ 392.
[24] Gerhart, B., S. L. Rynes, and I. S. Fulmer (2009). Pay and Performance:
Individuals, Groups, and Executives￿ , The Academy of Management An-
nals,3:1,251 ￿ 315.
[25] Greiner, B. (2004), "The Online Recruitment System ORSEE 2.0 - A Guide
for the Organization of Experiments in Economics", Working Paper Series
in Economics 10, University of Cologne, Department of Economics.
[26] Fehr, E. and K. M. Schmidt (1999). "A Theory Of Fairness, Competition,
And Cooperation", The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114(3): 817-868.
[27] Fischbacher, U. (2007), "z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic
experiments", Experimental Economics,10(2):171-178.
[28] Hill, C. W. L., and G. R. Jones (2001), Strategic Management. Houghton
Mi› in.
29
Jena Economic Research Papers 2010 - 046[29] Ho⁄man, B., J. and D. J. Woehr (2006), "A quantitative review of the rela-
tionship between person￿ organization ￿t and behavioral outcomes", Jour-
nal of Vocational Behavior, 68, 389￿ 399.
[30] Holt, C. A. and S. K. Laury,(2002), "Risk aversion and incentive e⁄ects",
American. Economic. Review. 92,1644￿ 1655.
[31] Kosfeld, M. and F. von Siemens (2007) "Competition, Cooperation,and
Corporate Culture", IZA Discussion Paper No. 2927.
[32] Kristof, A. L. (1996), "Person-organization ￿t: An integrative review of its
conceptualizations, measurement, and implications", Personnel Psychol-
ogy, 49, 1￿ 49.
[33] Lazear, E. P. and K. L. Shaw (2007), ￿Personnel Economics: The Econo-
mist￿ s View of Human Resources￿ , Journal of Economic Perspectives 21:
91-114.
[34] Ledford, G. E., E. E. Lawler, and S. A. Mohrman (1995), "Reward Inno-
vations in Fortune 1000 Companies", Compensation and Bene￿ts Review,
27: 91-114.
[35] Levitt, S. D. and J. A. List (2007), "What do Lab Experiments Tell Us
About the Real World?" Journal of Economic Perspectives 21: 153-174.
[36] List, J.A. (2007), "On the Interpretation of Giving in Dictator Games￿ ,
Journal of Political Economy 115: 482-494.
[37] Maio, G.R., A. Pakzeh, W.-Y. Cheung, and K.J. Rees (2009), "Chang-
ing, priming, and acting on values: E⁄ects via motivational relations in a
circular model", Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 97, 699-715.
[38] Mathieu, J. M., T. Maynard, T. Rapp, and L. Gilson (2008), "Team E⁄ec-
tiveness 1997-2007: A Review of Recent Advancements and a glimpse into
the future", Journal of Management, 34, 3, 410-476.
[39] McLeish, K. N., and R. J. Oxoby (2007), ￿Identity, Cooperation, and Pun-
ishment￿ , IZA Discussion Paper No. 2572.
[40] Nalbantian, H. and A. Schotter (1997), "Productivity under Group Incen-
tives: An Experimental Study", American Economic Review, 87(3), 314-41.
[41] Orrison, A., A. Schotter and K. Weigelt (2004), ￿Multiperson contests: An
Experimental Examination￿ , Management Science. 50(2), 268-279.
[42] Oyserman, D., and S. W. S. Lee (2008a), "Does Culture In￿ uence What
and How We Think? E⁄ects of Priming Individualism and Collectivism",
Psychological Bulletin 134, 311￿ 342.
[43] Rey-Biel, B. (2008), ￿ Inequity Aversion and Team Incentives￿ , Scandina-
vian Journal of Economics 110(2), 297￿ 320.
30
Jena Economic Research Papers 2010 - 046[44] Roccas, S., L. Sagiv, S. H. Schwartz, and A. Knafo (2002), "The big ￿ve
personality factors and personal values", Personality and Social Psychology
Bulletin, 28, 789-801.
[45] Schneider, B. (1987), "The people make the place", Personnel Psychology,
40: 437-453.
[46] Schwartz, S.. H. (1992), "Universals in the content and structure of values:
Theoretical advances and empirical tests in 20 countries", In M. P. Zanna
(Hrsg.), Advances in experimental social psychology (vol. 25, pp. 1-65). San
Diego, CA: Academic Press.
[47] Schwartz, S. H. (2005), "Basic human values: Their content and struc-
ture across cultures.", In A. Tamayo & J. Porto (Hrsg.) Valores e trabalho
[Values and work], pp. 21-55. Brasilia: Editoa Vozes.
[48] Schwartz, S. H. (2009),"Basic Values: How they motivate and Inhibit proso-
cial behavior", in M. Mikulincer and P. Shaver, (eds.), Herzliya Symposium
on Personality and Social Psychology, Vol.1. Washington: American Psy-
chological Association Press.
[49] Schwartz, S. H., L. Sagiv, and K. Boehnke (2000),"Worries and values",
Journal of Personality, 68 (2), 309-346.
[50] Schwartz, S. H., G. Melech, A. Lehmann, S. Burgess, M. Harris, V. Owens
(2001), "Extending the cross-cultural validity of the theory of basic human
values with a di⁄erent method of measurement", Journal of Cross-Cultural
Psychology, 32, 268-290.
[51] Schwartz, S. H., Lehmann, A., & Roccas, S. (1999), "Multimethod probes
of basic human values.", In J. Adamopoulos & Y. Kashima (Eds.), Social
Psychology and Culture Context: Essays in Honor of Harry C. Triandis.
Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
[52] Srull, T.K. and R.S. Wyer Jr. (1979),"The role of category accessibility in
the interpretation of information about persons: Some determinants and
implications", Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 18, 1660-1667.
[53] Verquer, M. L., T. A. Beehr, and S. H. Wagner (2003), "A meta-analysis of
the relations between person-organization ￿t and work attitudes", Journal
of Vocational Behavior, 63, 473￿ 489.
[54] Wuchty, S, B. E. Jones and B. Uzzi (2007), ￿The Increasing Dominance of
Teams in Production of Knowledge￿ , Science 316: 1036-9.
31
Jena Economic Research Papers 2010 - 046